I’m beginning a project over the next month or so to analyze key
conservative policy documents, manifestos, conference proceedings, and white
papers from 2009 to present. The hope is that I might generate some sense about
the depths of what some have alternately theorized as a demographic and/or
policy crisis in conservative politics. My working hypothesis is that existing
discrepancies between conservative political programs for specific policy
change and those of progressive organizations reflect conservatism facing a
difficult choice. On the one hand, conservatives managed to squeeze 40 years of
governing dominance out of the post-64 political landscape, crafting a
political alliance around shared feelings of marginality and anxiety, taking
Nixon’s “silent majority” and letting it speak with policy dominance by the
time of Reagan’s “Morning in America.” Triangulation by entities like the DLC
and Bill Clinton testified not to enormous Democratic success but instead to
the power of this conservative rearrangement of what Cindy Patton calls
“political space” in America. The 2008 and to a lesser extent the 2012
presidential elections, however, find conservatism trapped between rehashing
its same tired appeals to a shrinking demographic base or embracing policy
changes that might alienate members of either its fiscal or social policy base.
I begin today by examining a very
recent statement regarding the core values of modern conservatism, entitled
“Reform, Restore, Modernize—An Agenda to Restore the American Dream.” The
document comes out of recent meetings of top political conservatives like Ted
Cruz (R-Texas). A recent Jim Pethokoukis column in The Week did well to analyze the document from a Right economic
position: he bemoans the “time-travel tale” of the document which, he argues,
the only thing holding us back from a new moment of American dominance is a
return to Reagan-style economics.
Pethokoukis’ argument is insightful,
but I am not here to comment on macroeconomic virtues and vices. Instead, I
want to examine this statement for the type of appeal it crafts, what sort of
audience it imagines. After all, conservatism faces a historically unique
challenge at this moment to hold together a coalition commentators tend to
divide into social and fiscal conservatives. Social policy claims about the necessity of
defending traditional institutions of family and society are withering as
support for gay marriage reaches historical highs. At the same time, real wages
have stagnated against inflation, creating an opportunity for economic appeals
to carve out broader new constituencies. The post-2008 bailout fury created an
opening for economic populism, one that was seized on by a coalition of
political organizations and motivated individuals to crest in the wave of
political organization that found its greatest gains in the 2010 midterms.
Actual economic populism,
however, is of limited political utility for conservatives (and perhaps
Democrats, depending on how strongly you view the capture of the Democratic
party by corporate interests). Economic populism does not discriminate, its
advocates work by sketching Manichean lines between those at the center of an
economic hierarchy and a virtuous “people” unjustly positioned at that
periphery. Uncorking economic populism, as many did after 2008, did a lot of
important work to guide intense feelings into political action at the polls.
But it also intensified rather than alleviated the political crunch facing
conservatism, namely: the principles behind economic populism draw on feelings
of marginalization and victimage that often appear in public in exactly the
kinds of statements and images that might be most off-putting to emerging
demographics to which conservatives will have to appeal to survive in the
political long term. So when Rick Perry focuses on a narrative about the
“Makers and the Takers” in his presidential campaign in 2012, and others like Red State’s Erick Erickson engage in the
rhetoric of the “53% vs. 43%” with reference to those who pay taxes and those
who don’t, economic populism shows its seedy and, demographically
counterproductive, underside.
At the same time, conservatives
tend to favor policies that include less regulation, fewer taxes, and more
freedom for enterprise. Unsurprisingly, these policies are generally favored by
large businesses because of the way they enable freer commerce and impose fewer
restrictions on businesses. It is in the short-term electoral interest of
conservatism to thus cultivate rage against economic injustice, but absolutely
fatal to its long term interests, unless one believes that there is more blood
to be squeezed from the turnip of trickle down economics. Complicating matters
further are emerging demographic issues: economic populism tends to appeal to
xenophobic elements of American political culture, meaning that the “people” of
economic populism will often be defined narrowly in ways that eliminate
economically beneficial proposals like comprehensive immigration reform from
consideration. Thus economic populism might well be aimed at the core
constituencies of the GOP rather than at the opposing party.
Documents like the one I am about
to analyze, then, emerge on difficult terrain. They increasingly try to do the
impossible, threading a needle between maintaining rage about current economic
circumstances while also encouraging political fealty to ideology that
encourages fewer, not more, regulations and restrictions on the very large
entities to which much of this blame is directed. “Crony capitalism” is a key
term used by conservatives to try to massage out this political knot, as it
offers a way to conflate governance and business to politically productive
ends. However, the concept has to do an awful
lot of legwork to maintain the
conservative constituency. I want to suggest in this post that at least one
section of the document fails to do so.
The document opens with a
reference to the American founding. This reference to the founding is an
exceedingly common reference in post-2008 conservative political materials. No
doubt, the reference to the founding, a supposedly neutral point of origination
of the nation, serves as a place around which all conservatives should be able
to gather. The Founders themselves are then described as figures that “sought
to secure national independence, provide for economic opportunity, establish
true religious liberty, and maintain a flourishing society of republican
self-government.” One especially interesting note in that passage is the phrase
“republican self-government,” which is seemingly redundant. Is not all
republicanism governance from within? After all, governance from without is not
considered governance, per se, or at least is certainly not regarded as
legitimate. Going out of their way to frame the matter as one of republican
self-government suggests this document will in part attempt to continue to
constitute its audience in a populist manner that focuses on the importance of
self-government as a concept.
The document then moves on to use
the term “fusion” to describe the marriage between economic and social
conservatives. The reference to fusion no doubt calls to mind the ideology of 1950’s
conservative Frank Meyer, whose “fusionism” sought to bridge the gap between
traditionalists, libertarians, and anti-Communists. The framing here is almost
one of chastisement, as it argues that Constitutional conservatism “reminds
economic conservatives that morality is essential to limited government, social
conservatives that unlimited government is a threat to moral self-government,
and national security conservatives that energetic but responsible government
is the key” to a healthy America.
At least one issue the authors of
these documents are confronting is that Meyer’s “fusionism” probably always
fell short of the name. It is more proper, in fact, to speak of something like
“covalent bonds” produced by mid-century conservatives rather than the act of
atomic reconfiguration suggested by the metaphor of fusion. The interests of
“national security” conservatives (then anti-Communists), economic conservatives,
and social conservatives were linked, yes, but more by the careful cultivation
of certain attitudes rather than the production of a philosophical schema
capable of resolving what might prove, logically, to be fatal contradictions.[1]
What they held in common were not political ideologies, per se, but instead
shared positions of political marginality.
It comes as little surprise,
then, that the document then uses a fair amount of combative language to
describe the “restoration” of America.
The authors are “fighting to retake and resolutely defend” American
principles. Metaphors of conflict and battle tend to suggest an antagonistic
situation wherein the stakes of the political battle are themselves
existential. These are not matters of disagreement, but instead survival. Rather
than resolving the messy debate about fusionism, one which the 2008 and 2012
elections emphasized represented a crisis for conservatism by way of
demographics, conservative political documents like this one have to double
down on principles of union through persuasive concepts of popular unity and togetherness
instead of tangible policy proposals that might offer a way forward only at the
risk of fracturing the base.
After priming the audience both
for a fight but also suggesting that what is to come is a reminder about what
America “really” is, the document moves into its elucidation of areas of policy
and specific recommendations for the achievement of goals in this area. The
areas are “An Agenda for American Recovery and Growth”,” “An Agenda for a
Stronger and More Peaceful America,” An Agenda for Cultural Renewal and the
American Family,” and “An Agenda to Hold Government Accountable by Preserving
the Constitution.”
Under the section entitled “An
Agenda for American Recovery and Growth” one finds a call that reforms should
“reward hard work” while also creating “ a level playing field for everyone.”
The document also animates this vision with the idea of the “who” that should
benefit from this recovery. The “middle class” appears twice in this section
along with “ordinary people” and “hard-working American families.” There are also four references to either
“taxes” or “taxpayers.” And for good measure, there are five instances of
reference to “everyone.” The population that
deserves this playing field is positioned almost exclusively in opposition to
the government. In each of the four major captions the actor preventing
Americans from realizing their potential is “excessive regulations,”
“Washington’s fiscal mess…government spending,” “ineffective government
programs,” and “ Obamacare.” When it comes to the economy, the effervescent
powers of all Americans, it seems, would shine if only the government would get
out of the way.
When the document then moves to
the specifics, suggestions remain somewhat generic. Under the subheading
“Restore a Fiscally Accountable Government that Works for Everyone, Not Just
Washington” for example, there are seven bullet points six of which represent
somewhat empty or impossible demands. They do, however, articulate to a set of
political subjects that many conservatives have taken on as pet projects during
the Obama administration.
The first bullet points reads “Pass
Congressional rules that require balanced budgets, responsibility and accurate
accounting.” This point touches on several important political nodes of
interest. It connects to public anger and resentment over the bailouts of in
the fall of 2008. which many thought represented “irresponsible” spending. It
also connects to a series of common talking points raised against the stimulus
bill, namely that it was implicated in corruption (hence the reference to questionable
accounting practices as implicitly problematic) and was also charged with
running up the deficit.
The second bullet point reads
“Pass spending levels that adhere to discretionary limits already promised in
law.” This point touches on common claims about the problematic lack of a
budget during the Obama administration and also taps into general resentment
against government spending on social service programs. The budget argument has been well documented
by Dave Weigel and others: with political gridlock at historical highs (link to
recent Atlantic article) following certain ordinary points of budgetary order
is not a practical option for a government that has to keep operating.
Moreover, “discretionary spending” is a term of art that refers to moments
where the Congress utilizes its power of the purse to fund the actions of
federal agencies. This is the precise kind of spending that continues without
authorization in a new specific piece of legislation in lieu of passage of a
robust and full budget document. At the same time that the call appeals to
those who follow the ins and outs of budget disputation, the term
“discretionary” itself might signal otherwise to a less wonkish audience.
“Discretion” implies a strong agent-centered notion of choice. Hence the
government is in the business of exercising its discretion to decide what does
and does not receive funding. Where parts of conservative communities are
caught up in discourses fueled by images of “makers and takers,” where the
latter vote Democratic just for “free stuff,” the idea of reigning in
“discretionary” spending might mean something quite different for many
different conservative audiences of this document.
The next statement reads “End
fraud and overpayments that send taxpayer dollars to those who abuse the
system.” Such a statement connects directly to a number of budget and spending
controversies as well as debates over health care. Indeed, one of the primary
talking points in favor of the Affordable Care Act was that it would lower
health care costs. A key rebuttal to this point was that simply tightening
screws on waste and fraud in government programs like Medicare would achieve
substantial budget tightening. Similarly, ideas of fraud circulate intensely
in debates over federal spending on social services like food stamps/programs
like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, as myths like the “welfare queen”
refuse to die.
The next statement about ending
“direct payments to private companies based on connections instead of the best
product” wades into a retroactive debate about the stimulus bill (less well
known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act). Solyndra controversy, in
which the government invested stimulus funding into a solar panel company that
went belly-up, constitutes a key political talking point for many
conservatives, who argue that the result of a cozy, cronyist relationship
between the Obama administration and Solyndra officials resulted in a bad
investment. And of course the notes
about paying companies “based on connections” also serves to generate a
connection to frustration with the bank bailouts, which were perceived to have
emerged in part due to a cozy relationship between federal financial regulators
and large financial entities.
The next claim is that the
government should refuse to authorize the Export/Import bank, an entity that
guarantees loans to foreign entities that purchase U.S. export. The Ex-Im bank finds itself the convenient
target for “cronyism” which seems to target any relationship between government
and business, and in this case the fact that the bank guarantees loans to
foreigners makes it an easy target because (ostensibly) the entities it
benefits are not American, although on balance the bank represents a net gain
for American commerce.
The document then turns back to
2008, arguing that the government must “Stop pumping tens of billions into big
banks at the expense of average Americans.” The clear reference to the 2008
bailouts reflects abiding discontentment with the financial crisis and its
management as a key factor animating conservative politics. Especially given
the language of “average Americans,” the statement not only works by stating
that the present is a moment when the
government is pumping billions into large banks, but also positions these large
corporations as the opposite of “the people,” indicting the government for its
decision to side with them.
The next statement reads “Reform
financial and banking laws that enshrine permanent bank bailouts in law.” This
statement works through a version of sleight of hand and refers to the
Dodd-Frank banking reform legislation passed in the wake of the 2008 crisis. In
fact, Dodd-Frank does not legally codify bank bailouts in law, it only says
that banks which are valued over a certain amount are “systematically
important” to the economy and thus eligible to receive federal assistance. By conflating
a legal obligation with a legal option the statement makes it seem like
Dodd-Frank, which in many senses restricted large banks, actually benefited
them.
At this point, it makes sense to
pause and take a breath. I have analyzed only one of a total of sixteen
different subheadings within the document. I probably return to analyze a few
others at some point. But it is fair to say that the economy has been the
dominant political issues for the GOP over the last 5 years, along with
Obamacare. Indeed, a large percentage of the rhetorical case against health
care reform was tied to arguments suggesting it would harm the economy. One
should expect that this document, representing the statements and opinions of
some key GOP leaders on economics, would have a bit more to it. Instead it
seems much more interested in reminding folks of how they feel instead of generating proposals that aim at resolving the cause of that anxiety and fear.
The various and sundry dog whistles buried in the document, including references to the stimulus, Obamacare, Solyndra, and welfare, just to name a few, suggest that conservatives are experts at referring to certain scandals and crises so long as their audience has already been primed to become interested in them. But, one wonders what sort of broader constituency this document imagines. (Indeed, a look through the other sections does not inspire much optimism). There are zero references to immigration in the document. Issues valued by traditionalists like gay marriage are instead briefly mentioned only obliquely through references to "traditional family structures."
A document that tries to be something for all Americans is not a very useful political document. Moreover, a document that fails to bring to the table some positive and active sense of a political agenda suggests that conservatism remains locked in a self-sustaining feedback loop of political negativity. Conservatives oppose Big Government, a weak economy, waste, fraud, and unfairness. With the exception of the first of this quintet, none of these represent meaningful partisan difference out of which politicians make hay. And even the point about size of government seems to have been squeezed within an inch of its life, as debates over the debt ceiling and budget suggest making meaningful inroads into the deficit will require substantial cuts to very popular government programs, including Medicare, the military, and social security. The path forward remains murky for conservatism, at best.
Next in the series I will examine the transcript of a Hudson Institute symposium on the prospects of conservative populism, and the contradictions therein.
[1] It
might be said that the bond was true fusion to the extent that it could be
manufactured by the unity of skepticism the three groups shared towards black
Americans. I think this description would also apply to numerous Democrats who
switched parties during the 1960’s. That
a substantial portion of the disorder of the 1960’s was raced by virtue of its
attachment to the struggle for civil rights lends credence to this judgment.
No comments:
Post a Comment