Monday, May 12, 2014

Tackling the Crisis: A Review of Philip Mirowski’s Never Let a Serious Crisis Go To Waste

Making sense of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath is a daunting task. While there have been a number of popular press attempts like Michael Lewis’ The Big Short or the documentary Inside Job, the latter of which took painstaking details to paint a picture of the connections and players involved in the crisis, Philip Mirowski asks in his recent book Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown why the aftermath of the 2008 crisis did not spur some broad based legitimation crisis in the dominant channels and organs of the world’s economic and intellectual elite. Mirowski’s answer is well reasoned but also somewhat depressing: economic intellectuals take for granted the scientific elements of economic theory, and, reading deductively, understand the crisis as expressing not some retroactive judgment of economics as a discipline but instead as expressing a sort of intrinsic unpredictability with which those interested in markets and economics will just have to live.

The book proceeds to make four arguments that are of vital interest to rhetoricians and those studying the intersection between argumentation and social theory. 1) Demands for “consensus” reinforce orthodoxy within economic thought, 2) Economics departments and economics faculty suffer from a feedback loop problem wherein the economic incentives from coming to conclusions that will sound good to private sector employers in the financial sector pollute academic conclusions, 3) “Everyday neoliberalism” is sustained through quotidian vectors of representations and encounter that naturalize economic decisions as proceeding from some godlike mantra as opposed to effects of human action, and 4) Public interventions by public intellectuals in the area of economics like Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman were counterproductive insofar as they reproduced the notion that there were a limited number of “sides” to the debate over the crash while also suggesting a minor economic corrective rather than a wholesale philosophical corrective was needed to explain not only the crash but also the failure of those who helped cause it to reflect on their role.

I was very taken by Mirowski’s argument regarding “everyday neoliberalism,” because while it is, in some ways painfully obvious, he does lay out some compelling evidence worthy of consideration. For example, phenomena like the Freakonomics series, which tries to explain almost every sector of society in economic terms, induce a certain kind of talking about the economy as something natural. Or, as a friend and I routinely discuss, the rise of advanced statistics movements in sports, emblematized by Moneyball, brings left-progressives over to the side of the market with sexy talk of “market inefficiencies” and opposition to troglodyte scouts and coaches who just can’t understand the links between economics and progress. Another good example Mirowski cites, and one worthy of further study by rhetoricians, is the utter invisibility of any class outside the “middle class” in the vocabularies of news media, pundits, and politicians. Again, another rather obvious point, but stunningly demonstrative: could you go through the roster of leading politicians in the two major American political parties right now and find a dozen references to “the poor” or “impoverished” in their speeches and prepared materials? One wonders if this signals a deep, deep internalization of the market mantra: don’t mention the poor because those who are impoverished are so as a matter of their nature as opposed to their will?

The book’s argument with respect to the drive for consensus as a factor evading substantive engagement with the poverties of economic theory is also powerful. Mirowski is not only a professor of economics but also of the history of philosophy. Hence it comes as little surprise that he makes a claim about the relationship of how knowledge is presumed to work within expert spheres. Specifically, he argues that there is a tendency to assume that “expertism” implies “consensus.” Thus where there is absence of consensus, we do not have expertism as such but instead failed knowledge production wherein all claims are suspect. Reading from the famous Frank Luntz global warming memo which suggested that a consensus on climate science would force legislative action on global warming, Mirowski suggests that this thinking has proven especially pernicious in the case of economics, because while public intellectuals like Paul Krugman lob bombs at central members of what Mirowski calls the “Neoliberal Thought Collective” the work this does is often to assure the public that there is no economic consensus while the existence of a thing called “the market” (in the public view, I mean: Mirowski is very clear that for mainstream neoliberal economists “the market” does not exist, but is something which makes its own way in the world independent of economists) continues unabated. Thus the market continues to do its work even as what “economists” think comes to be represented as presumptively uncertain. If the central task for those concerned with the sustainability of the global system and especially those concerned with the massive inequalities and injustices that exist in the world is to challenge the mantra that “what markets say is reality” then minor repairs and rescue operations only emphasize that while markets do know, humans, even experts, cannot.

If I had to say a couple things critical of the book, they would be that Mirowski insufficiently theorizes the history of “expertism” as a concept in American public life and also that he struggles to locate the argument of the later Michel Foucault found in The Birth of Biopolitics, which Mirowski cites extensively. Regarding expertism, Mirowski assumes that the distance between the deliberating public and the realm of experts is one made by the confusion and misinformation circulated in public disputes about the economy. This is, as far as it goes, correct. But Mirowski could do more to highlight how politicians and pundits navigate the constitutive distance between “economics” and something like a fluid conception of “the public” (thought of as a discursive figure as opposed to a demographic) by pointing to how the existence of things as they are ratifies them retroactively as expressions of a general economic will. That is, simply by being, things are as “the market” says they are, which bakes in a certain level of presumption about the status quo. Mirowski seems, in many parts of the book, to understand this, which makes it all the more puzzling that he insists on reading the Foucault of The Birth of Biopolitics as descriptive rather than prescriptive: he insists that “Foucault…declines to allow that agents are somehow bamboozled by power/knowledge, since the market is posited to exist in a privileged epistemological space with special position in the regime of truth.” (p. 100). In fact, the Foucault of these later lectures provides one of the best possible answers to the classical dispute about false consciousness that has dogged progressives, because he argues that the market comes to function as if it were the only site of knowledge to explain the characteristics of a vast set of “non-economic” sectors i.e. cultural, familial, etc. Nothing in Foucault says it has to be this way, only that it is.


Overall, this book was very helpful for pushing one to think about the aftermath of the political crisis. It’s also very accessible: Mirowski has taken pains to write in a manner accessible to more than just theory-minded academics.  And for the more academically inclined he makes a host of interesting points, like his ability to connect the influence of Carl Schmitt to the Chicago School of economics. I would recommend it to anyone interested in neoliberalism, the 2008 financial crisis, social theory, or the rhetoric of science/rhetoric of inquiry.

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Conservatism's Mid-Century Crisis

Recently, it has become de riguer to argue that Barry Goldwater's political loss in the 1964 presidential election was a tactical loss but a strategic victory. Rick Perlstein argues in Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Political Consensus that while Goldwater lose the election by a sizable margin he ultimately settled on themes and policies that would resonate for years to come for Americans of all stripes, setting the stage for conservative hegemony in the last thirty years or so of the twentieth century. So, what was the general situation leading up to the start of the eventual conservative renaissance in 1968?

In Jonathan Schoenwald's masterful book on sixties conservatism, A Time for Choosing, he argues that there were three main kinds of conservatives in America that emerged out of the post-war consensus. There were traditionalists, libertarians, and anti-communists. Traditionalists favored a normative family structure, remained committed to religious observance, and argued for the maintenance and preservation of institutions. They were mostly conservatives in the traditional Edmund Burke sense of supporting the conservation of long lasting institutions following the premise that what had been made and stood the test of time had some intrinsic value. Libertarians were persuaded by works like Barry Goldwater's ghost-authored The Conscience of the Conservative that the new key value for conservatives was small government, which could liberate the genius of the individual from the yoke of government control while at the same time evading the ills of centralized government on clear display in the Soviet Union and other sites. The third type of conservative, the anti-communist, bought into a more negative ethos of opposition to communism as opposed to a positive believe in the power of either time-tested institutions or the resilient individual.

At the same time that these conservative elements emerged, America was in the midst of real economic advancement. The middle class was rapidly expanding. Substantial government investments in infrastructure and the military were providing the basis for extensive growth. Post-war GI Bill grads found higher education attainable. Yet these heady economic successes were not mirrored in the realm of politics for conservatives, who found themselves on the outside looking in. Joseph McCarthy's virulent anti-communism had made red baiting into a counter-productive political tactic. Robert Welch's accusation in 1959 that Republican Dwight Eisenhower was a closet socialist further stigmatized the public brand of anti-communism. Of course, Welch's accusation represented a natural outcome for conservatism that public policy consensus had painted into an increasingly small corner. The post-war and New Deal consensus took for granted the necessity of a large and bureaucratic state apparatus. Dwight Eisenhower, after all, built the interstate highway system. A Cold War consensus made foreign policy a difficult policy arena to create separation between the now-dominant Democratic party and Republicans.

Further complicating matters was that economic advancement itself posed a subtle threat to traditional institutions. Real economic progress meant less leisure time for some, but more capital to use during said leisure time. As Lisbeth Cohen writes in A Consumer's Republic, modes of conspicuous consumption came to function as a certain kind of citizenship. But with less free time for some, consumption itself had to substitute for other kinds of community life and vibrancy. And consumption and commerce are poor substitutes, lacking the shared and non-ephemeral characteristics of shared public life.

It was not as if all of this happened in a vacuum, of course. A number of conservatives saw the threat of the liberal consensus. Richard Weaver wrote in 1947 in Ideas Have Consequences that the rise of a technocratic political/state apparatus threatened to elide humanity, replacing the human "generalist" who could speak to multiple areas of interest. Weaver feared the sovereignty of the individual posed the greatest threat to traditional institutions; where the individual was lionized above all else, America would become a community of individuals defined solely by their differential existence and not by any sense of shared issues and common interests. Others, like William F. Buckley, sought to organize a conservative intellectual bulwark to counteract what they saw as the progressive technocratic consensus embodied by the emergence of the statist consensus and reinforced by thinkers like Richard Hofstader. to this end, Buckley funded National Review and kickstarted the Young Americans for Freedom. Other thinkers, like Russell Kirk, contributed to Buckley's publication, seeking to constitute a kind of conservative vanguard that could produce arguments opposed to the rising liberal consensus.

However, there was no evidence that shared interests would cause a natural coalescence between these disparate conservative elements, nor that well-crafted essays in magazines would be able to paper over these divides. Libertarianism posed a potentially fatal threat to traditional conservatism because its ideological commitment to individual choice threatened to open up institutions to attack by way of individual achievement and critique. At the same time, traditional institutions operate to hamper and constrain individual choice. Rabid anti-communists who could not go so far as to call the hero of D-Day a red were lost as well, confident that their interests were not represented by the mass public but unsure why.

By the early sixties conservatism faced a crisis. There was on the one hand a critical mass of intellectuals who had thrown their weight and money behind developing a conservative "ideas industry" to act as a counterweight to the liberal consensus. There were also emergent constituencies hungry to identify against the liberal consensus, even as they in many cases benefited from the largesse of government spending. However, no one had yet succeeded in translating the work of the conservative intelligentsia into a set of digestible political idioms, in no small part due to the apparently constitutive rather than contingent ideological divides within the set of potential conservative voters.

Barry Goldwater emerged as the presidential candidate who would attempt to make the first public case for new conservatism. Goldwater, a robust libertarian and anti-communist, was famous for ignoring the needs of his audience in favor of going into partisan screeds against welfare cheats and communist subversives, according to rhetorician J.C. Hammerback. However, Goldwater's seeming extremism was the exact opposite of what conservatives needed in 1964. After all, conservatives were already anxious about their marginal political status. And, many conservatives (and Americans generally) were wary of radicalism in any form, left or right. This was due not only to the persistent political labeling of socialist and totalitarian governments as "radical" and "extremist" but also because the intensity of European fascism did not float far from the American imaginary. Goldwater's comments, like "Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice" uttered at the Cow Palace in San Francisco during the 1964 Republican nominating convention, did not so much work as effective utilitarian arguments as they did serve to accentuate conservative worries about appearing to be political outsiders instead of legitimate democratic interlocutors.

To united the disparate groups of conservatives, one could not simply hammer home ideological points about welfare cheats and communist plots, as Goldwater was inclined to do. His hard hits against government programs alienated many voters who were consciously benefiting from them. And his hardcore anti-communism raised the specter of at least foolish red baiting or at worst, resurgent McCarthyism.In short, when your political party is struggling to maintain political relevance, making political arguments that call out the obvious problems with the existing consensus not only fail to gain traction because folks are already disposed towards that consensus because of institutional and identitarian inertia, but it also reminds the constituency that might be friendly to your argument that they are in fact marginalized, and produces a distance between them and your claims based on their perceived radicalism.

In short, early sixties conservatives were certain they existed and had a cause but they were somewhat unsure of what that cause might be, or at least, how they might articulate it in a way that could build a coalition rather than further exacerbate tensions between the factions. In an earlier post on Ronald Reagan I in part addressed how conservatives navigated themselves out of this pickle, and I will hopefully return to that point at more length.







Wednesday, December 18, 2013

On Discussions of the Democrats and Populism

Typically the readers of this blog encounter a number of posts about the prospects of a conservative populism. A recent Noam Scheiber piece at The New Republic, however, got me thinking about where the idea of a progressive populism is at the moment. Scheiber's piece is an insightful read on what populism offers for the Democratic party at the moment. I am not as sanguine about the prospects for a leftist populism as Scheiber is, for reasons I will outline.

Scheiber structures his argument by contrasting the economic populism of Bill de Blasio and Elizabeth Warren with so-called politically "neutral" positions from advocacy groups like Third Way. Visiting their website, one notes that they describe themselves by noting that, "Third Way represents Americans in the “vital center” — those who believe in pragmatic solutions and principled compromise, but who too often are ignored in Washington." Third Way's recent decision to put economic populism on blast, then, disturbs Scheiber, who assumes that there is more common cause between Third Way and economic populists than daylight. Indeed, he even notes that Third Way's co-founder Matt Bennett, is willing to admit as much in a piece by Dave Weigel. What seemingly confounds Scheiber is why, exactly, Third Way would create such a kerfluffle when they have so much common cause with the policy agenda of the economic populists. Weigel suggests in his piece that the explanation for the kerfluffle is related mostly to the ability of a certain set of financial interests to maintain a delicate balancing act between maintaining political influence amongst the politically strong Democrats while at the same time being able to oppose policies that would necessitate higher taxation and more corporate regulation, like entitlement expansion.

Scheiber goes on to argue that opposition to populism might be best explained by the way that populist rhetorical and political strategies induce action where playing the insiders' game results in less change. As he says, "when you actually try to reform the status quo, any approach that relies on courting insiders (lobbyists and businessman, often regulators and Washington think tankers) rather than ginning up public support typically stalls out before long." He notes that because of the power accumulated by special interests, only appealing to "the people" can offer a way to break up the regulatory and legislative gridlock in Washington. Scheiber's warrant for this claim is not only recent empirical data from the legislative record, but also the assertion that the old split between producerism (late 19th century style populism as represented in groups like The People's Party) and progressivism (think voting rights plus temperance plus labor rights plus Protestant ethos plus regulation) is vanishing, if not vanished. For Scheiber, the rise of the 1 percent as a political and economic class has played the role eliminating the classic schism between producerists and progressives.

I appreciate Scheiber's piece but I think he has fallen into the trap of equating a rise in economic inequality with an absolutely corresponding rise in consciousness about the given political situation. Before we had the 1 percent (and Occupy Wall Street, natch) there was the Tea Party, an economic populism that is not entirely different. Scheiber's view of an economic populist like Elizabeth Warren is that she endorses a political platform that plays well: punishment for big banks, defense of entitlements, and financial regulations. Research actually suggests that all of these talking points merge nicely with the beliefs of those who are Tea Partiers (for more see this very helpful book by Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson). The Tea Party emerged out of real and palpable anger about how big banks escaped from 2008 almost scot free, many Tea Partiers were defensive about entitlements  (notably, their entitlements not necessarily the expansion of them to others), and wanted to combat the special interests that had let the financial sector run free. If we learned anything from the 2010 midterm, it was that the feeling of anger and frustration was itself populist, even if it could be channeled and pushed towards political interests which might do relatively less to address these sentiments through policy proposals.

Historically, one might point out that the producerist/progressivist split was never actually eradicated. Instead, a combination of economic prosperity following the second world war and its convergence with a regime of robust statism combined to paper over what might have otherwise been antagonistic tensions between producerists and populists. Of course, after a while rising economic prosperity actually exposed potential schisms between the two groups, most notably because of the ways in which increased affluence threatened to replace Protestant morality with crude consumerism. This schism, among others, was played to by conservatives who launched their first populist campaigns of the 20th century under the sign of individual freedom, which allowed them to stitch together business interests that disagreed with the existing strength of the regulatory state and more properly "populist" elements of the nation struggling to reconcile their existence with the pace of innovation, change, and transformation in the country.

Scheiber's claim that unified resentment for the 1 percent can drive Democratic populism seems overly rosy. Invoking "the people" never occurs for just one political side: claims for "the people" are made on a complicated terrain where the rhetorical power of populism is always subject to capture and use that evades the intent and scope of the claims of those who initially deploy it. While it is appealing to imagine that claims against the economic elite intuitively warrant a move to support Democratic politicians, this is not a given for several reasons. First, previous and current Democratic administrations, from Clinton to Obama, have not shown the willingness to be appropriately harsh and antagonistic to business interests to demonstrate that they place the interests of "the people" over established political "facts" in Washington. Second, "the people" functions as a sign of collectivism but in America collectivism runs into the competing grammar of American individualism. Even if collectivism sometimes wins out to suppress the individualistic elements in American identity, this is most often true in matters of foreign policy not economic matters where a fevered imaginary stoked by modern-day Horatio Algers well versed in the work of Ayn Rand seems fit to run free. Third, the argument ad populum operates as a rhetoric that draws on the position of "the people" as fundamentally outside the position of power in order to establish its claim. Specifically, "the people" are enunciated just as much if not more so as positioned against the government rather than only corporate interests. To the extend that these two blend, all the better for conservative forces. Finally, with a Democratic firmly ensconced in their second term in the White House, it is unclear that a populist rhetoric will intuitively work for rather than against the Democratic Party, as the 2010 work of the Tea Party shows.

Scheiber is right that the Democratic Party should focus on putting together a meaningful policy agenda based on fighting back against corporate common sense in the federal government. However, attaching this effort in advance to the figure of "the people" risks more harm than good, as the public sphere will get caught up in debating who "the people" really are and that fight will be fought on terrain friendly to conservative interests. Better to craft a policy agenda that actually speaks to a broad swatch of interests gathered along shared points of interests than to place the populist cart before the horse.





Sunday, October 13, 2013

The Last Stand of the Greatest Generation

Yesterday in Washington, D.C. the "Million Vet March" set upon national parks in D.C. to raise visibility about the ills caused by the goverment shutdown. Building on some modest momentum from early October incidents, in which veterans scheduled to visit the monuments could not get in owing to the shutdown, this October 13th march aimed to focus and recirculate this outrage. To this end, conservatives, led by Sarah Palin and Ted Cruz, gathered  to storm major national parks in D.C. A focal point of these protests are the "Barrycades," the name given to the small portable metal fences set up by the National Parks Service to block off museums and memorials from the public.

These "Barrycades" were central in the visual and textual representation of yesterday's protests. Take this photo, which I found at conservative blog Powerline:
This image does considerable historical work, some at the surface and other at depth. The callback to Reagan, whose demand that Mikhail Gorbachev "tear down" the Berlin Wall is considered a high point in the conservative imaginary, if not that of much of the nation, suggests not only a moment of parallel historical importance but also a geopolitical frame of friends and enemies, where the "wall" (which we tend to conceive of as suggesting deep political divides instead of the perhaps more appropriate permeable imbrications of political life) structures the nation in a manner which implies divisions themselves are the problem.

Applying this implied attachment to unity to domestic politics, however, offers challenges that underscore the disparate nature of foreign and domestic policy. In foreign policy political rhetors face powerful constraints when they use rhetorics of unity and cosmopolitanism: namely, not only does the appeal of the Westphalian nation state system remain power (and routinely indexed by the inability of media and experts to read international politics through anything beyond  Manichean frame) but foreign policy still involves the "foreign" and so rhetorics of us and them, however noxious, at least fall on tried and true targets: other (and different) nations and populations. The effects of this rhetoric are predictable and the difference between "us" and "them" functions to stabilize American identity over and against those external identities. Even if it doesn't totally stabilize such identities, these rhetorics of us and them do provide predictable routes through which argument to be joined.

In the context of domestic politics, the dynamic is different. If, following the work of Jeremy Engels, Jennifer Mercieca, and others, we live in a demophilic political culture, that is, one which fetishizes ideas of unity and harmony over and above agonistic values of conflict and struggle, then a rhetoric of "tear down this wall" constitutes a demophilic call for the abolition of politics, the destruction of difference in the name of unity and togetherness. The "Barrycades" represent the divisions that have poisoned and ruined our politics. That the figure in the photo is a wheelchair-bound veteran is also double significant. First, the image of the veteran summons up a Brokawian "Greatest Generation," notably a generation of Americans that lived before the "senseless wars" of Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, not to mention the salient historical notion of a unique political division in the Sixties and the madness of Watergate that followed. American democracy was ok until the "walls" of the Cold War and walls between "people" and government were drawn. Second, a figure in a wheelchair invariably summons up a well of sentiment attached to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who is widely known for being one of the most able "movers" of the federal political system. With a political system deadlocked and economic catastrophe looming, the reappearance of a physically disabled figure summons the template for political action (and, not very subtly, implies the "action" is so easy even the disabled can do it!)

This image suggests a continuation of the political strategy employed by the Tea Party: investment in empty ideas of unity and togetherness paired with feel-good pablum that angers no one. After all, who could be against national monuments? Moreover, war veterans are some of the most universally beloved figures in the economy of public discourse. As reports indicated, however, the protest was poorly attended. This might suggest the well of "empty" anger based on the valorization of unity is running dry.

Sunday, September 29, 2013

The Redemption of Walter White

Tonight's finale of Breaking Bad seems to be generally well received in the instant-information world of Twitter and Facebook, although like many of you I eagerly await tomorrow's write-ups at Time, Grantland, and Hitflix.com, among others. In general, I expect the ending to be heavily praised for three reasons. First, unlike the somewhat controversial ending to The Sopranos this ending focused on the resolution of loose ends: there were no Russians left running in the words or Members' Only jacket-related assassination speculation. Secondly, the show left Jesse Pinkman alive and (somewhat, at least) free not only from the Neo-Nazis but also Walter White. Thirdly, the structure of the episode allowed viewers to explicitly disavow themselves of any positive connection with Walter White related to his deluded convictions that he was "helping his family."

It is this third point I want to explore in this blog post. Walter's actions in the episode, while nominally gesturing towards a recognition of his own intense egotism, Lockean fetish for individual ingenuity, and an ultimate acceptance of his fate (and destruction), actually create conditions for the audience to once again root for Walt as  a hero of sorts.

Take, for example, Walt's encounter with Elliott and Gretchen at the home of his old Gray Matter partners' home. When they discover Walt, Elliott holds a small kitchen knife at him, flinchingly. Walt looks down condescendingly at the knife and says "If we're going to go that way, you're going to need a bigger knife." Not only does this serve as an excellent Crocodile Dundee throwback, it also gives Walt a moment to act as a Heisenberg-esque action star, one who acts calmly and cooly in the face of violence. And one would be remiss to not note the phallic relevance of suggesting that the man who took his one-time girlfriend from him needed to get a "bigger knife."And of course Walt comes out of this showdown having "persuaded" his old business partners to start a nine million dollar trust for Walt Jr. with his meth money.

And what about Walt's almost superhuman ability to dodge the police? They miss him in the snowy car at the New Hampshire bar. They hear rumors of him all over town, so much so that even Marie knows, but he nevertheless manages to sneak into Skyler's house. And while the show has certainly established Walt's criminal capacity, just how easily can a cancer ridden man dodge massive police surveillance?  (I understand the false flags Marie refers to in the phone call but, still, Skyler's house?).

The scene with Walt and Skyler is the most pivotal of the episode. As Walt finally begins to make his peace with her she says she's tired of hearing about how he does it all for his family. In this moment she is a cipher for many in the audience who have grown weary of Walt's hoary self-serving moralizing that  has served to displace his own culpability under a regime of attachment to the idea of the nuclear family. But in a turn, Walt admits that he was doing it for himself all along. His selfishness admitted, Walt gets one final chance to connect with his daughter (THAT HE ABDUCTED!) by coming clean about his real motives all alone.

From this point on the episode becomes a series of moves by Walt to atone for the crimes of his selfishness. Enraged that Jesse is cooking again, Walt plots to kill him and the gang of Neo-Nazis, not knowing that Jesse is now toiling in the Giorgio Agamben Bare Life Meth Basement (All Rights Reserved). In the show's final bit of grim homage to Mr. Wizard's World, Walt erects a remotely-triggered pivoting machine gun. Confronting Todd's uncle's gang, Walt realizes that Jesse is not willingly serving them but instead their slave.

The set up whereby Walt discovers that Jesse is enslaved rather than a willing partner certainly strains credulity. King Neo-Nazi, after Walt accuses him of partnering with Jesse, claims that Walt has sullied his honor and demands that Jesse be brought in so that Walt may see his broken and finished state. Certainly, this is near Bond-villain territory stuff. In the past Todd's crew has made no show of morality or principle, killing easily for pragmatic or economic reasons rather than on principle. In this case however Jesse's appearance enables one last element of Walt's redemption: seeing Jesse's state, he tackles him before he sets off the remote gun, holding him down while the gun blasts the Neo-Nazis to death, save Todd. Following the shootout, Jesse chokes Todd to death, avenging his meth slavery. This entire scene is certainly gory, but also has more than a hint of action movie flavor in the way it is shot: stylized blasts from a cannon that paint the outer wall of the building red, an unleashed torrent of seemingly infinite bullets that hit the Neo-Nazis who seem to be just so grouped closely enough together.

Once Jesse kills Todd, Walt and Jesse are left, with Walt holding a gun which he puts down and gives to Jesse, urging Jesse to kill him. For once, Jesse is free of Walter White's power and refuses to do so, instead hopping in the car and taking his leave. Walt, meanwhile, in a scene set to some musical stylings of Badfinger, dies surrounded by the cooking equipment in the Neo Nazi meth lab. Splayed out on the floor of the lab in a Christ-like callback to "Crawl Space," Walt dies, having given himself to rescue Jesse and murder a gang of Neo Nazis, not to mention the morally bankrupt Lydia whose Stevia-laden tea he so carefully poisons with his now highly Chekhovian-ricin. At the end of the show, Walt's ledger is clean: he has provided information to Skyler that will allow her to barter with the police, Walt Jr.'s future is provided for, Jesse is free, and the Neo Nazis are dead, along with Lydia. Despite the fact that over the course of the show Walt is a rapist, a murderer, and a drug maker, the structure of the narrative continues to suggest his heroism in an almost tragic fashion, rather than a polemic condeming Walter White.

In her recent book Washed in Blood Claire Sisco King examines three periods of American masculinity and their relationship to traumatic cinema, looking at Cold War America, the 1990's, and the post 9/11 period to argue that various films index the changing nature of American masculinity, trauma, and national identity. Whether thinking through cinema as a response to military defeat (Vietnam), various and sundry culture wars (the 90s), or a newfound ineradicable vulnerability (September11th), King argues persuasively that cinema tracks these moves by suggesting how the masculine action hero who heroically gives themself transforms what could be understood as a tragic flaw into a heroic or even laudable trait. I think it is impossible to separate the popularity of Breaking Bad from the contemporary political context of American politics, specifically thinking about the show as emerging at the very moment that America's polity faces increasing demographic changes that, from a political standpoint, put the white male, not to mention the nuclear family, very much on the run at both a demographic and symbolic level. After all, America has its first black president. Gay marriage is increasingly visible at the state and federal level. Traditional relationship structures are undermined in public discourse at rapid rates (Think about how many useless "Girls in college are hooking up more!" stories you see in The New York Times, and then think about how Walter White would feel about his daughter, if he had one).

The show, however, is rarely understood in this political context, with critics instead praising the transcendent performances of the actors and actresses, especially Brian Cranston, and many insist that it may be the best show in the history of television. But I think it is fair to ask: what is the source of this praise? One response is to praise the show's formal characteristics: the cinematography is excellent, the direction crackerjack, and the acting superb. This is all true enough, although were are also in the midst of a television renaissance of such heights that one could credibly say that these things are true about any number of television shows.

I want to suggest that the show appeals by turning Walt's pathological egotism into a relatable character trait rather than a tragic flaw. To wit: simply admitting that his ego was the root of it all convinces Skyler to let him see his daughter again. Or another point: up until this week many would be at pains to distinguish Walt from the Neo Nazis, suggesting that the only real difference between the two of them is that Walt's racism is sublimated through his own (unearned) sense of self-worth while the Neo Nazis bear the markers of "conventional" (and thereby less threatening) racism. But the show's finale features Walt slaughtering a bunch of Neo Nazis. And then, most troubling of all, Walt humanity is found in his recognition that the treatment of Jesse at the hands of the Neo Nazis is too much even for the rather evil Walt to tolerate. But consider what Walt has done to Jesse over the course of the show, not only that he is responsible directly for Jesse's enslavement but also an unlistably long set of violences to Jesse, including Jane's death (murder? Probably murder.)

In a nation still in the throes of economic doldrums and a political scene where demographic shifts are rapidly outpacing the capacity of political discourse to manage difference, Walter White offers a fantasy that simultaneously suggests the legitimacy of feeling victimized and aggrieved so long as one simply owns up to the selfishness of such feelings. This is not too far off from the unreflexive celebration of Going Galt and valorization of "job creators" that permeates contemporary conservative discourse: selfishness is a virtue, and pride is a reflection of one's ability to apprehend the market's brilliance (and of course the brilliance of one's own recipe for pure blue crystal meth). Personally, I think a darker ending was necessary to hammer home Walt's evil, to give the viewer absolutely no place to hide. But instead we are left with this redemption of Walter White.

Twenty five years ago, Oliver Stone made Wall Street and was surprised to discover that viewers came out of the film not skeptical of the ills of finance capitalism but instead in love with Michael Douglas' portrayal of Gordon Gekko, the rapacious financier whose charisma and attraction made Charlie Sheen's Bud Fox seem a pale and tiny human in comparison. Oliver Stone is not known for his subtlety and so one might easily believe that he had simply, accidentally, produced the opposite result. On the other hand, interviews with Vince Gilligan suggest that he understands the element of Walt White that might lie within all of us (or, certainly at least, within the public realm where discourses of masculinity and victimhood circulate together to generate praise for Breaking Bad as a show that demonstrates "complexity" rather than the pathological actions of a brilliant but blowhardy chemistry teacher). Much of  the praise heaped upon the show, and the extra acclaim will no doubt be piled on this finale, might derive from a very troubling source: that is, our capacity to identify with the very worst of Walter White but disavow that identification by praising a set of formally impressive but politically problematic narrative structures.

Saturday, September 7, 2013

ObamaCharisma

The recent debate over Syria has highlighted a clear political dynamic of the Barack Obama administration: the tendency of the opposition Republicans to oppose almost any policy simply because it is associated with Obama. This is certainly not unique, at least in simple terms to the Obama administration. A multitude of American progressives remember the Bush administration more for its foreign policy boondoggles that they stridently opposed than the social policies (like Medicare Part D) that ran counter to a number of conservative political positions. Going back further, one might remember the attacks on Reaganomics, a name similar to Obamacare in terms of its ability to reduce the understanding of a set of policies into a metonymic expression of a president’s worldview rather than a more rote unpacking of the content of said policies.

When critics, politicos, and citizens conflate policies with presidential personas we are in the messy realm where politics and charisma intermix. Max Weber offers a popular and influential understanding of charismatic authority as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by them ." Weber’s definition acknowledges a difficult problem for those interested in the study of political authority: a leader may not be selfsame with “the people” lest the distance that sustains their authority be abolished.” At the same time, there must be relays of identification between a leader and “the people,” lest the gap between them spawn a legitimacy crisis that weakens or even deposes the leader. Charisma is the bulwark of ether that suggests an unpopular decision by a leader should be read by the populace as evidence of the leader’s character rather than an indict of the leader’s judgment. Alternately (or perhaps simultaneously), a charismatic leader elevates themselves above the people, as a hero of sort, claiming exceptional status as earned.

Naturally, many thinkers are suspicious of charisma. Some, like Kenneth Burke, find in the charisma of a figure like Adolph Hitler the poisonous medicine of tragic unity, where the leader’s charisma blended with their naturalized affinity with their population in a way that created a nationalist feedback loop. Going back further, Plato worried that too much charisma might ruin the Republic, with the charisma-laden rhetor lying not far away from the demagogic despots who might lead “the people” astray.

The most interesting question about charisma, however, lies not with the rather futile debate about whether or not to ban it from the Republic. As numerous scholars of emotion and affect remind us, “feelings” are intrinsic to our democracy and we cannot banish them from the world of politics without constructing a somewhat tragic relationship to an ideal and emotionally purified politics that never has and never will exist. Instead, as Joshua Gunn suggests in his excellent piece in the Western Journal of Communication on Huey Long, we can understand a leader’s charisma as having at least two possible structures. In one, the leader maintains a kind of distance from the audience, routinely offering them most of what they want while denying at least one important emotion and/or policy item, producing a desire for the leadership of the rhetor even as the relation between speaker and audience remains split. On the other hand, Gunn’s reading of Huey Long implies there may a second rhetorical kind of demagoguery, more prone to rhetorical burnout, where the leader and vox populi merge into one avatar, a fiery figure of populist bluster that offers the intense satisfaction of popular sovereignty but is also left without any rhetorical firehouse to put out the intense burning passion ignited for a pure populism.

In the case of the Obama presidency we see a similar but somewhat opposite dynamic: the flight away from any policy associated with the president regardless of its content, or even its legitimate connection to President Obama. Take, for example, the “Obamaphone” a racist meme circulating extensively in the conservative blogosphere, Based on a short video clip of a black woman flashing a new cell phone and saying “I got an Obamaphone!” the meme circulated to suggest that Obama had created a program for anyone to get a free phone, working in tandem with the argument that Obama secured his electoral majority by promising (in 2008) and delivering (in 2012) “free stuff” to his constituents. The video suggests a racial animus underlying these claims, not unlike the (mostly white) figures who do not benefit from welfare in a 2012 campaign ad put together by Mitt Romney’s campaign team.

A second, more obvious example that came to mind when having a chat with a colleague the other day, is Obamacare. Rather than referring to the bill by either its official name (The Affordable Care Act) or even the shorter acronym (ACA) there is by now a more or less bipartisan consensus that the bill is to be called Obamacare. Despite the fact that hundreds of legislators (and lobbyists and citizens) contributed to the passage of the ACA, media critics and scholars all seem more or less resigned (or is it excited) to define the bill through the Obama administration and vice versa.

A third instance I will not dwell on long, but it is the continued assertion of Obama as central to the political imaginary. Whether found in the hilarious references to Obama in Louis CK’s television show whenever something goes wrong (“Fuckin’ Obama.”), the various anti-Obama iconography popularized by Tea Partiers, or the circulation of racist Obama images in various conservative counterpublics (the “witch doctor” image, for example), the ubiquity of Obama is at once a reflection of American political culture’s fetish for the presidential but the racial element also exceeds that element. (This may be true of most difference that threatens the normatively white and masculine office of the presidency: anyone remember Hilarycare?)

The recent Syria debate suggests again a move by conservatives on the basis of opposition to the president’s authority in and of itself, that is, his charisma. The particularly opportunistic nature of Republican oppositions suggests this. While some, like Rand Paul, may have familial and historical backgrounds that suggest their decisions are more principled and less opportunistic, for a number of rank and file Republicans who supported previous military interventions, its difficult to read this move as anything less to another knee jerk reaction to deny Obama something just because he wants it rather than on serious policy grounds. (Note: I don’t want to be construed as saying the Obama administration is on the side of principle here. It is a depressing fact that foreign policy, much more than domestic policy, tends to reveal similarities rather than differences in the parties. This is in part why the second Iraq war is such an outlier: it was a real moment where party affiliation really mattered on foreign policy, though many Democrats were complicit in authorizing the war).


These opportunistic moves are very short sighted, however. Which of these arguments about the “cult of Obama” will carry over when the Republicans have to campaign against presumptive 2016 nominee Hilary Clinton? Being against Obama on principle is not only nihilistic, it will be counter-productive for the GOP in terms of generating a party identity that can argue its policy differences with the dominant party. The tendency to reduce all Democratic actions into reflections of Obama may hoist the conservatives on their own petard, as they scramble for a set of Hilary-specific charisma attacks rather than carving out meaningful policy differences.

Friday, August 23, 2013

So You're Still Rooting for Walter White...

And so, apparently, is Skyler. I've already gone through why Walter White is a wholly objectionable figure elsewhere. But I wanted to talk a little bit about why viewers and critics remained attached to the show, finding it continually praiseworthy. I don't exempt my own judgments from the dynamic I am attempting to analyze: I remain invested in the show as well, and think so far this seasons two episodes have been excellent. But there are at least two strains of fandom that I want to talk about. First, those who are invested in Walt as the Heisenberg "badass" and view Skyler as some kind of killjoy, and second, the more sophisticated arguments about how Skyler is the moral center of the show, serving as a sort of cipher for the audience to participate in the narrative without being corrupted by Walt.

Representatives of the first view have become scarcer as Walt's naked ego-driven ambitions have become clearer, rendering less and less credible his claims that he "Just wants to provide for his family." Comments like those of popular twitter character (and AV Club commenter) @ZodiacMotherfucker (who is known for his all-caps tweets) suggest a masculine identification with Walt, as in this example:



While one might roll their eyes at this (its a comical account, clearly) the comments sections at any number of websites that do recaps of Breaking Bad like Hitflix or the AV Club have sections of fans who do root for Walt a somewhat surprising amount. For example commenter "HISLOCAL" on Hitflix says that "I'm getting a little tired of Jesse moping around, for the same reason I got tired of Skyler's attitude towards Walt. I understand that any of us would, in reality, act like Jesse or Skyler, but it's just kind of a buzzkill to watch on TV." The commenter understands the relation between the fantasy of television, but nevertheless admits that the charge of the show is the connection to Walt and his survival/success.

Similarly the most popular scene from the first episode of this season was the showdown in the garage between Hank and Walt. Even though Hank has the physical upper hand on Walt when he punches him, Walt maintains a mental edge with his gruff "Tread lightly" comment that finishes off his soliloquy about his own power and capacity for dread. This phrase was all over twitter following the episode, and even showed up on fan paraphenelia and imagery, permeating Gchat statuses and social media discussions of the show. They belie a certain kind of admiration for the badass side of Walt's "Heisenberg" persona.

Even articles that take a distanced and critical view of Walt depoliticize the grid of identification that sustains the relationship between the viewer and show. For example this Slate piece argues that Skyler is the best character on the show because "she’s the one who reminds us that it’s necessary to loathe Walt. She is our moral grounding." All well and good, but the last stanza of the article claims that it is easy to get sucked into identifying with Walt because of "the show’s narrative logic—Walt must overcome obstacle A to achieve goal B—to the point of blinding oneself to the evil of the particulars and their endpoint. We root for Walt because we want the show to continue." I disagree with that assessment because the formal characteristics of a show do not necessarily guarantee our investment. No matter how many Dick Wolf procedurals are put it, the level of intensity between the viewer and say, Jerry Orbach's Lenny Brisco is often less intense than that between them and Bryan Cranston's Walter White.

In her recent book Washed in Blood Claire Sisco King examines three periods of American cinema wherein shows featuring sacrificial male leads have helped America to "work through" difficult national traumas in a manner that reified and stabilized rather than undermined the hegemony of white masculinity. King examines cinema from the period of Vietnam, the nineties, and post 9/11 America to make her claim. The critical supplication permanently attendant to the drama of Walter White suggests his suitability as an avatar for another American trauma: the first period of the nation that sees a black man in the White House. Breaking Bad saw its critical star really take off during its second season in 2009, where the adrenaline pumping tales of a science teacher who "finds himself" when he is confronted with the threat of cancer. This despite the fact that very early on in the show many of Walt's "struggles" are coded as such only by a misogynistic masculinity: we have no context to determine whether Walt's feelings of restriction within his marriage are legitimate gripes or results of his own small minded selfishness, as later seasons might suggest. What Walt is "finally awake" to is not his objective status as a victim but instead the legitimate possibility that his situation might be able to count as a situation of victimage in need of redress.

In this way Walt's "break bad" authorizes itself to take a position typically denied in the "mass public" according to Michael Warner: Walt may operate simultaneously as both the righteous agent of his own professional/marital vengeance and also take a position that satisfies the need to matter (be seen) attendant to a public where the cost of white male privilege is also the denial of the subtle pleasures involved in relaxing and "being seen" rather than constantly gazing. One describes these as subtle pleasures only on account of Walt's whiteness and maleness: that it takes the trauma of cancer to push him into the exercise of his agency suggests in part the sinister capacity of the subject to interpret trauma not as a sign of something gone wrong but instead evidence of the correctness of what has been, driving them, in melancholic righteousness, towards the pursuit of control and mastery that has only appeared as a horizon rather than a reality. That it took many viewers many seasons to realize Walt's horrible and empty center suggests this reading has more than a little merit.