Critics
have identified the short campaign ad “Morning in America” from Ronald Reagan’s
1984 presidential campaign as one of the most effective—and
influential—campaign ads of all time. No doubt the ad stands out for not only
the context, which was one the most successful presidential campaigns of all
time, one that saw Reagan crush his challenger Walter Mondale by taking 49 out
of 50 states, but also for its content, which presented a bucolic and peaceful
view of regular American life, one that Reagan compared favorably to the social
upheaval of the 1960’s and the economic difficulties of the late 1970’s.
Reagan’s
appearance at this juncture, positioned neatly between the upheaval that ushered in and
undermined Richard Nixon but before the end of the Cold War, has been the
subject of considerable scholarly attention. I want to here meditate on several
different readings from critical scholars that often focus on one aspect of
Reagan: his status as a simulation. Diane Rubenstein reads Reagan’s presidency
as a kind of Baudrillardian simulation par
excellence, a president who seemingly stood for nothing and in so doing
could be the concept of America itself. While other leaders like John Kennedy
or Dwight Eisenhower could draw on the kingly residues of the nation’s higher
office with either reference to bodily charisma (Kennedy’s sexuality) or
military prowess (Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Allied Commander), the trappings
of the old sovereign understanding of the king also constrained and threatened
these leaders, subordinating their charisma and power to the Ego-Ideal of a
perfect, universally powerful (and religiously designated) leader.
While I am often loathe to draw on
his work, Rubenstein’s deployment of Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal
wherein signs serve not a representational function but instead a
self-referential one, ushers us into an
era where “territory no longer precedes the map but is generated by it” (p. 584). This concept explains Reagan’s success in a
way purely semiotic theory cannot: a representational account of language is
often frustrated by a figure like Reagan precisely because the presence of
“objective” indicators of his flaws as president—scandals, wars, an interest in
astrology—did not in practice
collapse Reagan’s presidency. Suspended between the subjective understanding of
Reagan’s failures as a policymaker and his enormous symbolic political capital
is this self-referential status of the Reagan presidency: Reagan and the
America he was a part of were separated tautologically from the crisis and
disasters that attended to his time in office.
In this way Reagan can admit to the
arms-for-hostages deal while remaining distant from any responsibility for it,
as Rubenstein notes that Reagan’s statement “’I told the American people that I
did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me
that it is true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.’” (p. 587).
Even when there is a real problem, Americans continue to feel as if everything is ok. “Morning in America”
produces—anticipates even—this sense of good feeling even in the face of still
troublesome conditions. Hence Rubenstein’s point about maps generating
territory; much the same could be said for political space, drawing a
connection to theorists working in the area of publicity.
Michael Warner focuses on how
Reagan’s image made him the “champion spokesmodel for America” in Warner’s
words (p. 173). The phrase “spokesmodel,” seems intentionally gendered here: a “spokesman” pitches a product while a
“spokesmodel” is feminized, simply displaying , gesturing, and pointing to a
desirable object, generating a symmetry between their own sexual desirability
and the object. Reagans capacity to instill identification with his audiences,
even where this identification was not selfsame with popularity in the public
polls, was such that he could be said to have an immense amount of political
capital in the sense that those who insulted him found themselves constrained,
and those who opposed him politically found themselves the subject of public
ire. Like “the people” Reagan does not
have speech, he simply stands in to point to America’s self-referential
goodness, in much the same way that people simply living their lives in “Morning
in America” provide the proof that America is a great nation. In having
seemingly little agency or persona, Reagan mirrored the impotence of the public.
Warner’s reading works similarly to that of Joan Copjec, who argues in Read My Desire that Reagan’s impotence
was constitutive of his authority rather than evidence of a lack. Identifying
with Reagan did not threaten one’s sense of self in the way that embracing a
charismatic John F. Kennedy or a geographically-specific George W. Bush might.
As an added bonus, such signifying does not invoke Ernst Kantorowicz’s theory
of royal power, producing a president capable of living up to symbolic
expectations, ones that merely ask for a president to be like “the people” rather than one who is above and rules them in a
manner guaranteed to activate that traditionally American robust ideology of
individualism.
Citizens,
Warner says, long for “privileged public disembodiment” (p. 176). Abstraction is the key technology for
producing the modern public sphere, and where consumerism substitutes for civic
participation, citizens seek to consume in a way that reduces that anxieties
associated with existing. Reagan’s befuddlement made him one of the citizens.
Reagan could thus witness disasters with the citizenry. Moreover, he could,
like cititzens, admit to some rational level of culpability for a disaster or
scandal, but maintain his emotive, human distance from them. In line with
Warner’s work, this model of present distancing from politics explains how
citizens might routinely cathetic to a political system that rarely, if ever,
serves their interests: they “rationally” know it to be true but feel
otherwise, and feeling trumps.
It is
telling that “Morning in America” includes no disasters, no threats, only a
happy and bucolic nation rising to meet the day. It also includes no persons of
color. The ad opens in the morning hours, showing people either working or on
their way to it. Amongst the various occupations depicted are paperboy, farmer,
firefighter, and white-collar work. The first twenty seconds of the advertisement
are dedicated to commerce: folks either
go to or are at work, or engage in acts of commerce: a voice over mentions increasing
volumes of home purchasing while the ad shows some presumably new homeowners
marching a large, just-purchased rug into their new house. Meanwhile the
voiceover reminds that “more Americans will go to work this morning than ever
before in the nation’s history” while commenting on the remarkable drops in
interest rates, contrasting the Reagan recovery with the difficult days of Jimmy
Carter. These are not just the conditions that facilitate prosperity: they are
prosperity.
Following these displays of
commerce, the video transitions into the scene of a smiling, elderly woman watching
a young, heterosexual couple getting married, while the narrator adds that
today “6500 young men and women will be married.” The narrator then notes that,
with today’s lower inflation rates, these married couples can anticipate
economic prosperity will remain stable. Out of 53 seconds of content in the
advertisement, fully 15 seconds are dedicated to the events of this marriage,
which include not only the walk down the aisle but the smiling procession into
wedded bliss: not to mention, a prosperous future. The closing embrace between
the grandmother and her newly-married granddaughter, both clad in white, transforms
into the US Capitol building in a screen transition, symbolically producing
these ordinary Americans living their life with a prosperous future,
emphasizing how the center of American life is the population itself, rather
than the government. In fact, this appearance of the Capitol—along with a brief
shot of a firefighter schoolchildren, and some soldiers raising the American
flag—are the only shots of government agents in the entire commercial until
Reagan’s face appears at the end. It is of course notable that the shot is of
the Capitol: the building that houses a multitude of, rather than one, of
America’s leaders, creating a kind of relay of multiciplicity that reinforces
Reagan’s version of populism.
Indeed,
after this brief shot of the Capitol we repeatedly see American flags, being
raised in the morning in a variety of different contexts like schools and
military bases. This, we are told, is the daily life of America: marriage,
work, learning, symbolic acts of patriotism. We see a carpool taking someone to
work, the hug from grandmother to granddaughter, people smiling and waving. The
message is clear: the American people are doing very well, very well indeed.
And this happy shared living mirrors the economic prospects of the nation. If Reagan’s
“Time for Choosing” could manufacture anxiety our of prosperity, and if Nixon’s
silent majority gave Americans a way to make sense of the chaos of the 60’s
without indicting themselves, “Morning
in America” made the fact of living, of going about one’s quotidian business
into tactile proof that America was on the right path.
Indeed,
this calm morning exists in part because of one major absence, the absence of
the government. Though the ad is for
Reagan’s presidential campaign, Reagan himself does not appear until the last
few seconds of the advertisement. While there are agents of the government
present, it is almost always figures who represent either local
government—firefighters and schoolteachers—or civic necessities, like the
aforementioned firefighters or officers of the military. Government here is
mostly absent, present only when there is threat to life and property (fire,
war) or when so localized that it can be directly connected to the community
will, as in the schoolhouse. Otherwise the life of the community is defined by
their own acts: commerce, labor, love, with no government present.
It bears
noting that this population is industrious, virtuous, hardworking, and finding
fulfillment in their relations with one another. The absence of inflation and
the reduction of other economic negatives, combined with the felt positivity of
the Americans living their lives in the ad campaign suggest an America where
prosperity of the population mirrors the economic prosperity generally. That
these are achieved in the absence of the state is no accident. After all, the
idea that the default character of the American “people” is that of a peace and
prosperity is a very old notion, but politicians have maneuvered around in it
in a number of different ways. Nixon’s silent majority worked by producing
peace and prosperity as the desire of most Americans, and used the appearance
of instability, protest, and dissent throughout America to confirm and reassure
those who felt anxious and troubled that what was occurring was not the “real”
America. Nixon, of course, was fighting a pitched battle against a more-or-less
openly legitimate social welfare state. By Reagan’s time, this consensus had
begun to crumble, and so Reagan’s production of calm as the appropriate
character of the movement works to suggest America is on the right path.
Establishing
that the American people were in the process of returning the nation to its
greatness helped to create conditions felicitous for American conservatives to
rewrite American civil space as a site for pitched battles between on the one
hand a peaceable, hardworking and family-driven—and flatly, white—majority of
Americans one one side against “political” individuals who attack and threaten
to undermine “traditional” American cultural mores by pointing out asymmetries
in power and existing injustices. Cindy Patton argues in “Refiguring Social
Space” that the new right articulated a neutral concept of “civil rights” as
the simple right of individual—here conflated with cultural—existence. In this
way groups begging for “special rights” like the Equal Rights Amendment were
fracturing and violating American civil rights by watering down the “real”
struggles of the Civil Rights Movement through particularizing identity
maneuvers that performatively eradicate the consensus even as they testify to
the attraction attendant to the fantasy of a smooth and consensus-ridden
democratic public. Conservatism needed these particularizations to threaten something,
and that something was Morning in America. The other step in this process was
for conservative rhetors to matriculate state-phobia from its Cold War context
into a more useful mechanism for understanding domestic politics, a theme I
will soon return to at length.